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Abstract 
Medical advances and historical fluctuations in the demographics are contributing to the rise of the average age in the 
Western world. These changes are creating a growing requirement for organizing home care for the elderly. For handling 
these demanding tasks, currently assigned to immediate family members, eHealth systems are considered and extensively 
researched. As these systems manage personal and health-related data, protection of privacy is paramount. To that end, we 
have developed privacy-preserving protocols based on a novel eHealth system architecture, so that user data is protected, 
while accountability is ensured and all necessary data is available to appropriate care-provisioning entities.  
© 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of 
CENTERIS/ProjMAN/HCIST. 
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1. Introduction 
The medical advances and historical fluctuations in the demographics are contributing to the rise of the 
average age of individuals in the Western world. These changes are also creating a growing requirement for 
organizing home care provision to the elderly individuals requiring assistance. Currently, these tasks are 
placed on guardians, who are most often immediate family members. However, a number of aspects constitute 
care provisioning, making the requirements and responsibilities of the guardians all the more demanding. On 
the one hand, the daily tasks, such as catering or cleaning need to be provisioned, but on the other, organizing 
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care that requires trained personnel, such as nurses or doctors, is also essential. Additionally, limited birth rate 
in the recent decades is creating a graying population. The number of available family members that could 
provide such assistance is therefore becoming increasingly limited. Therefore, as a solution for integrating 
different aspects of home assistance and taking the load of the guardians, eHealth systems are widely 
considered and extensively researched. They allow the monitoring of the elderly, or patients recovering at 
home, and possibly provide means of communication with them. Even though these systems are very 
important and provide valuable opportunities for solving the aforementioned problems, the research in this 
area has not yet fully tackled the accompanying privacy issues. As these systems perform monitoring and 
manage health related data, the protection of data and access control are of major importance. Also, in order to 
provide assistance to the elderly or patients†, communication with the caregivers should be ensured. On the 
one hand, this means that caregivers’ personal information, such as contact data, is also handled by the system. 
On the other hand, knowing a caregiver of a patient can reveal sensitive medical information about the patient. 
For instance, knowing which specialist is treating a patient may allow inferring his medical problems. 
Therefore, all privacy issues need to be tackled, so these systems can become widely adopted and deployed. In 
order to address this problem, we propose a set of privacy-preserving protocols based on a novel eHealth 
system architecture that would protect the data of its users, but would at the same time ensure that all the 
necessary data is available to appropriate care provisioning entities. More importantly, the protection of 
privacy would not impose limitations to the number of services, or the quality of care the system offers. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we describe the architecture and the functioning 
of an eHealth system considered in the protocol design. Section 3 describes the privacy-preserving protocols 
for controlling caregiver’s access to patient data and for contacting the patient’s caregivers. Section 4 provides 
an overview of the related work and section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Overview of the underlying eHealth system architecture 
The underlying eHealth system architecture is illustrated in Figure 1. The system is comprised of four tiers. 
Initial registration of all the users is handled by an administration centre. It is a trusted party that performs all 
the administrative tasks, such as verifying identities, issuing anonymous credentials to users or handling the 
billing. Another tier is the dispatch centre, a central entity that provides technical support and maintains the 
system software and the hardware components. For ensuring ease of deployment, the assumption is that these 
services are offered by a commercial entity. Therefore, the functionality of the system entails protection of 
private data from this tier. The dispatch centre is equipped with a trusted device – a device with simple 
functionality, which is trusted to perform its specified tasks. It is used for decryption and re-encryption of 
data, in order to have it transferred between authorized entities, while keeping it hidden from the dispatch 
centre personnel or external observers. Third tier of the system are sets of (wearable) sensors, which are 
installed at every patient’s site in order to measure and record health parameters of the patient. Finally, the 
central part of the home equipment is the base station, which is used to deliver the services to the user. The 
base station is installed when the user subscribes for the eHealth service. It stores the user data, such as sensor 
measurements, and controls access to it. The principal users or their guardians are given administrative rights, 
which allow them to set the functional and access control policies. Usually, appropriate medical personnel or 
immediate family members are given certain rights regarding data access. More details on the architecture of 




 In the remainder of this paper, principal users, both elderly and stay-at-home patients, will be referred to simply as ‘patient’. 
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such architecture can be used to ensure that all user data is protected, including identities of patients and 
caregivers, while at the same time ensuring that the authorized individuals can access the data required for 
provisioning the care to the user. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The global architecture of the privacy-preserving eHealth system with arrows representing communication channels between 
different entities  
The rest of this section focuses on the global functionality of the system. Both the patients and their 
caregivers initially register with the administration centre before being able to use the services of the system. 
The registration entails proving identity and personal information and obtaining an anonymous credential, 
which records this information and other system-related data [12, 13]. This registration step is required to 
provide accountability in the system. When the anonymous credential is issued to the users, they (both patients 
and caregivers) register with the dispatch centre which creates and maintains the networks of caregivers for 
every patient. All the users are recorded in the dispatching centre’s database as nodes of these networks 
(Figure 2). Their personal information (identity, contact and proofs of qualifications in case of medically 
trained individuals) is also stored encrypted with the public key of the trusted device. This information is used 
to allow authorized entities to authenticate the users before granting them certain rights, or for contacting the 
caregivers. The encrypted identities can also be used for deanonymization of a perpetrator in case misuse was 
detected. However, the identity is only revealed if a dispute handler determines that a misuse indeed took 
place.  
The creation of the patient’s network is performed with strict checks. Admission of a caregiver to a care 
network of a patient is allowed only if the caregiver has been invited by the patient and has been given an 
appropriate token. The dispatch centre also verifies that the patient approves the connection after verifying the 
real identity of the caregiver. When a patient approves the connection, he also assigns the authorizations to the 
caregiver. These authorizations determine what kind of requests the caregiver can make and which access 
rights he is given. For instance, only medically trained personnel can make requests to inspect the stored 
health information of the user. Furthermore, not only the role of the caregiver is used to perform access 
control. Access rights are assigned to each caregiver individually and are recorded in an anonymous credential 
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issued by a trusted entity within the system. They can be very fine grained, as they are issued to every 
caregiver individually.  
With the authorizations assigned to them, the caregivers can make requests to access the data in the base 
stations of the patients. These requests are relayed by the dispatch centre, where the first level of access 
control is performed. However, the access control here can only be coarse grained, as the protocols entail that 
dispatch centre cannot learn the specific authorizations or roles of caregivers, for improved privacy. Fine 
grained access control is performed in the base stations, where the information does not need to be 
anonymized or hidden.  
3. Privacy-preserving protocols 
This section describes in detail protocols for handling caregiver’s requests for accessing patient data in the 
base stations and for contacting a caregiver in case of emergency situations. The goal of this protocol design is 
to deploy the functionality of the eHealth system, so that it is ensured that data is available to authorized 
parties, but is at the same time appropriately protected. For instance, if the patient is in need of urgent 
assistance, the system ensures that he is given timely and appropriate care, but emergency procedures do not 
allow data to leak or allow imposters to defeat the security of the system. Even though the communication 
between patients and their caregivers is performed through the system, all commercial parts of the system, 
such as the dispatch centre, are not able to see the data passing by. Additionally, they are not able to request 
any data stored in the base stations of patients. The base stations themselves impose access control and 
authenticate the requesting parties. 
 
Fig. 2. Patients’ networks of caregivers, as maintained by the dispatch centre. The large silhouettes (in the centre of the star-shaped 
networks) represent patients and the small ones represent the caregivers, which are all pseudonymous. The dotted borders indicate same 
caregivers belonging to different networks, for which they have different, unlinkable pseudonyms.  
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3.1. Caregiver access to patient data 
The protocol for requesting and accessing patient’s data in the base station is illustrated in Figure 3. In 
order to be granted access to the data, the caregiver needs to authenticate and prove his authorizations. For 
improved privacy, the proposed protocols ensure that the requirements are fulfilled with minimal data 
disclosure. Even the caregiver’s pseudonym remains hidden from the dispatch centre, while accountability is 
still supported. 
The caregiver initially creates a request (REQ) to access patient’s data. Then, a fresh symmetric key (K) to 
be used for communication with the patient’s base station is created. This key, pseudonyms of the caregiver 
and patient and the request are then verifiably encrypted with the public key of the patient (PKPT). This 
encrypted information is sent to the dispatch centre, in order to be relayed to the base station of the patient. 
The dispatch centre is also supplied with the plaintext request and the verifiable encryption allows it to verify 
the correctness of the information (without actually learning the information itself) before sending it to the 
patient. It checks that the request that it sees corresponds to the one that is encrypted for the patient and that 
the patient’s pseudonym matches the pseudonym of the patient that will receive the request. The caregiver 
also proves that he holds appropriate authorizations (given by the patient in question), by showing a subset of 
authorizations contained in his anonymous credential, that the patient has assigned to him previously. This 
complete transcript is signed by the caregiver and relayed to the dispatch centre. Finally, for ensuring 
accountability, the caregiver is required to verifiably encrypt his identity information from the anonymous 
credential issued by the administration centre with the public key of the trusted third party. The identity thus 
remains hidden from the dispatch centre, which is still able to check that correct information is encrypted. 
 When the request and the additional information is received, the dispatch centre stores it in case later 
auditing is required, and performs all the noted checks. If they succeed and the authorizations the caregiver 
possesses allow him to make the specified request, the signed transcript is relayed to the patient’s base station. 
The base station performs similar verifications as the dispatch centre in order to verify the validity of the 
request and confirm the identity of the caregiver. It then decides whether the caregiver should be granted 
access to the requested information according to the very specific authorizations it keeps for him. In case 
access is granted, the patient uses the symmetric key it has received to establish encrypted and private 
communication with the caregiver. 
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Fig. 3. Handling caregiver’s requests to access data in the patient’s base station. 
3.2. Requesting urgent caregiver’s assistance 
In case of an emergency situation, a caregiver is required to urgently assist the patient. The dispatch centre 
is equipped with a calling module that sends specified messages to given numbers and relays received 
responses to the authorized entity, keeping them hidden from other parties. The base station of the patient 
records the policies that determine which caregivers should be contacted in that situation – primary and back-
up choices.  Protocol details are illustrated in Figure 4. The base station initially creates a request (REQ) for 
contacting the specified caregiver and sends it to the dispatch centre. The request notes the pseudonyms of the 
chosen caregiver and the patient, the message to be relayed and is signed by the base station with the patient’s 
signing key. It is encrypted with the public key of the trusted device (PKTD) and given to the dispatch centre 
together with the pseudonym of the caregiver. The dispatch centre relays the request to the trusted device 
together with the personal information (i.e. the profile) of the specified caregiver, which it stores encrypted 
with trusted device’s public key. The trusted device verifies the signing certificate of the patient and the 
signature on the request, in order to make sure that the request does not originate from an unauthorized party. 
It also checks the stored public key certificate of the caregiver, which records the pseudonym of the patient, in 
order to verify that he is indeed a part of the patient’s network. The trusted device then uses the encrypted 
profile of the chosen caregiver in order to extract the contact information from it. The contact information and 
the message are then sent to the calling module, encrypted with a symmetric key (KCM) shared between the 
calling module and the trusted device. The encrypted request is trusted as it could only have been created by 
the trusted device with which the encryption key is shared.  
After the calling module has sent the message, it deletes all the information except for the hash of the 
caregiver’s phone number and the pseudonym and the public encryption key of the patient, which is stored for 
a limited time frame. If a response is received from a number, a hash of which should correspond to one of the 
stored hashes, it sends the received response to the patient (via the dispatch centre) encrypted with his public 
key. 
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Fig. 4. Contacting a caregiver in case of an emergency. 
4. Related work 
There is a significant number of research initiatives focused on eHealth systems designed to assist elderly or 
stay-at-home patients. In the current proposals, the services eHealth systems offer usually consist of 
monitoring health parameters, assessing the measurements and detecting anomalies. The monitoring is 
performed with unobtrusive wearable sensors. Most research approaches focus on the development of the 
monitoring equipment, i.e. the body area sensor network. Desirable types of monitoring sensors were 
investigated by Lymberis [1]. Specific types of sensor readings were evaluated for their applicability and 
usefulness by Tabar et al. [2], Lo et al. [3] and Johnston et al. [4]. The proposals usually assume three-tier 
architecture with the sensor readings being recorded by a personal server and simply relayed to a remote care 
centre where they are assessed. Examples are proposals by Chakravorty [5], Jovanov et al. [6] and Kim et al. 
[7]. However, having a system that allows the patient to connect to his regular caregivers would ease 
commercial deployment of the eHealth systems and their adoption by the users. The central entity of the 
system would no longer need to employ medically trained personnel and would be offered by a commercial 
entity. The privacy is another important issue to be tackled in order to achieve wider adoption of these 
systems. It is recognized to be an important problem, Varshney [8], but not many proposals are addressing it. 
Work of Maglogiannis et al. [9] focuses on location privacy in patient telemonitoring systems. The SAGE 
system by Lin et al. [10] aims to protect from eavesdropping on patient health-related data sent to their 
practitioners employed in an eHealth centre and the proposal by Slamanig and Stingl [11] uses pseudonymous 
techniques to protect the link between the users and their medical records. In our work, we focus on all of the 
aforementioned relevant aspects of eHealth services with the intention of creating a system that allows the 
patients to perform data exchange with their regular and authorized caregivers and at the same time ensure 
that they are provided with timely assistance when it is required. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we propose a set of privacy-preserving protocols offered by a commercial eHealth system that 
provides medical and domestic care to the elderly and stay-at-home patients. Our proposal is based on a novel 
eHealth system architecture and the developed protocols describe authorized information exchange from the 
patients to their caregivers and a procedure for contacting a caregiver of a patient in case of emergency 
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situations. Having the eHealth services offered by a commercial entity is an important step towards large scale 
deployment of these systems and that is why our proposal is based on that assumption. Also, in order to be 
able to offer these systems to the users, privacy protection is of crucial importance. These systems handle 
medical data, which is highly sensitive and the users would trust the system only if their information is secure. 
The protocols proposed in this work protect the private information of both patients and their caregivers. We 
do not focus only on health related data, but also on the identities of all users – both elderly or stay-at-home 
patients and their caregivers. Commercial entities in the system cannot access any sensitive data and 
disclosure of data in general is kept to a minimum.  
The protocols allow the authorized caregivers to request and inspect medical information collected by the 
sensors. They also ensure that in case of emergency, a caregiver is notified and his attendance is confirmed. 
Besides data availability and access control, the system provides accountability. This means that if a caregiver 
tries to gain unauthorized access to the patient’s data, it will be detected. Furthermore, the focus is not on the 
misuse detection, but rather prevention. Strict procedures prohibit attackers – both external and internal, such 
as curious caregivers or dispatch centre personnel, to access the patient’s data.  
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